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ABSTRACT 
The Price-Anderson Act requires commercial nuclear power plants to maintain 
(approximately) $660 million in off-site accident coverage through two forms of insurance: market­
provided private insurance and self-insurance in the form of retrospective assessments of reactor 
owners. We examine how changes in retrospective assessments influence the safety incentives of 
nuclear reactor owners. As one would expect, increases in self-insurance premiums increase the 
incentive to install safety systems more quickly. However, a more important conclusion is that self­
insurance premiums as a function of reactor riskiness, rather than equal payments by reactor owners, 
yield a higher level of safety than under the current law. 
PREPARING FOR THE IMPROBABLE: 
SAFETY INCENTIVES AND THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT* 
Jeffrey A. Dubin and Geoffrey S. Rothwell 
The partial melt down at Three Mile Island showed that losses to the public from nuclear 
accidents could be less than those sustained by the electric utility owning the reactor. But the 
accident at Chernobyl impressed the world with the enormity of its off-site damages. During the 
week of the accident, subcommittees in both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives were 
debating the renewal of the Price-Anderson Act (PAA). The Act codifies insurance for nuclear 
reactors by providing for two levels of coverage: private market-provided insurance and industry 
self-insurance. However, the coverage for new facilities,including Department of Energy contractors, 
will expire on August l ,  1987. 
In considering the renewal of the PAA, policy makers should realize that the electric utility's 
behavior regarding safety is not independent of insurance premiums and coverage. The size of 
insurance premiums affects the firm's expected income and, hence, the incentive to engage in 
accident-avoidance behavior to protect this income. Attempts to design socially optimal legislation 
should not exclude the consideration of utility reaction to changes in the PAA. 
A more comprehensive approach to examining the effects of amendments to the Act is to 
consider how they alter investment in reactor safety systems. The marginal benefit to the firm of 
responding quickly to new opportunities for enhanced safety is the increase in the probability of 
enjoying income without an accident. But the cost of a safety system generally decreases with time 
as other firms push a new technology down its learning curve. Insurance complicates these opposing 
tendencies. As we demonstrate, installation times decrease with increases in industry self-insurance 
premiums and with the positive correlation of these premiums with reactor safety. 
Insuring Nuclear Power Plants 
The Price-Anderson Act has the dual purpose of "protect(ing) the public and .. . 
encourage(ing) the development of the atomic energy industry" (42 U.S.C. 2012i). It protects the 
public by providing compensation for personal injury and property damage to roughly $660 million. 
*While many people have assisted our research, some stand out for their special contributions: David Cain, Paul David, 
Peter Navarro, W. Edward Steinmueller, and particularly, Roger Noll. Remaining errors are our own. This research was 
funded by grants from the Exxon Educational Foundation to the Environmental Quality Laboratory at the California Institute 
of Technology and from the Center for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University. 
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It encourages the development of the industry by indemnifying plant operators and their suppliers for 
off-site damages above $660 million. In exchange for indemnity, operators assume strict liability for 
their actions after an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence," implying both a substantial discharge of 
radiation and substantial damages to persons or property.1 For lesser damages the rules of state tort 
law apply.2 
To compensate these losses, the PAA defines two levels of insurance. 3 The first is $160 
million in private insurance provided by American Nuclear Insurers (ANI). Premiums for 
commercial plants are adjusted to reflect size, location (population density and property values), and, 
after the completion of two years of operation, the reactor's probability of having an accident, 
measured by an "Engineering Rating Factor." The factor is based on plant characteristics including 
radiation exposure, regulatory performance, significant events, and containment integrity. Currently, 
the annual average private insurance premium for operating reactors is about $800,000.4 The 
premium can be reduced by up to 20%, or increased by up to 30%, based on the safety performance 
of the reactor. 
Second, there is a layer of industry self-insurance. After an accident, reactor operators 
would be assessed. I equally not more than $5 million apiece, i.e., the firm owning the disabled 
reactor would pay the same amount for off-site damages as all other firms. Assuming 100 reactors, 
the second layer provides $500 million in coverage. The Federal District Court in the district where 
the accident occurs would distribute these funds. If damages exceed the limit, the Court would apply 
bankruptcy principles by distributing funds to individuals in proportion to total damages. Above 
$660 million, the nuclear power plant owner, the builders, and the parts suppliers are relieved of 
financial responsibility for damages to the public. 
1. An extraordinary nuclear occurrence is the death or hospitalization, within 30 days of the event, of five or more people, 
or $2,500,000 or more of damage off-site to one person, $5 million or more such damage in the aggregate, or $5,000 or 
more of damage off-site to fifty or more persons (Subpart E, 10 C.F.R. 140). 
2. See, for example, Silkwood V. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Sup. 566 (D. C. Oklahoma, 1979) affirmed in part, reversed in 
part on other grounds, 667F.2d 908 (1981), reversed on other grounds, 104S.Ct 615 (1984). 
3. Other forms of nuclear power plant insurance include (1) property coverage (to $1 billion) available from American 
Nuclear Insurers or from a consortium of utilities, Nuclear Mutual Ltd., and (2) replacement power coverage from Nuclear 
Electric Insurance Ltd. The latter involves a six-month deductible, i.e., it will not cover the first 26 weeks after the accident, 
and will provide payments for only two years. The most important remaining uncovered cost is the principal and interest 
payments on debt and dividends to equity. See John Graham, "Three Mile Island Status Report," presented at the Atomic 
Industrial Forum's Nuclear Insurance Issues Conference, February 14, 1983. 
4. A portion of the premium is subject to refund following a ten-year loss experience period in the industry. According to 
ANI, refunds have been made in all years since 1967, the first year of eligibility under the refund plan. For example, in 
1983 ANI refunded 37% of the total premiums paid in 1973. Even with the high administrative costs implied by this refund, 
the average premium of $800,000 implies a probability of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence that is at least thirty times 
greater than that estimated for the average plant by the NRC (see discussion in text below). For example, the ANI's 
premium schedule implies an expected loss of approximately $35 million conditional on an extraordinary nuclear 
occurrence. If administrative costs accounted for 60% of premiums, the implied probability of an occurrence is 
approximately 0.9% (=0.4 x $0.8 million/$35 million). Either the private-market insurance is extremely expensive to 
administer or private insurers perceive a much higher risk of reactor accidents than nuclear plant regulators, or both. 
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The 99th Congress was unsuccessful in renewing the Pfice.,Anderson Act. On the first day 
of the session (January 3, 1985) two bills were introduced: HR 51 by Price (D-lliinois) would have 
increased the maximum ex post assessment per plant from $5 million to $10 million, whereas HR 
445 by Seiberling (D-Ohio) called for compensation of all damages. These two bills, plus HR 2665 
by Weiss (D-New York), were consolidated for mark-up in the Energy Subcommittee of the House 
Insular and Interior Affairs Committee. On the second day of discussion, Udall (D-Arizona), 
chairman of both the committee and subcommittee, introduced HR 3653. As shown in Table 1, the 
bill increased the first layer of insurance to $200 million (from $160 million) and raised the 
maximum payment by each reactor operator to $100 million (from $5 million), increasing total 
coverage to $10.2 billion. Although the subcommittee reduced the upper limit to $2.5 billion and 
the committee raised it to $8.2 billion, a compromise of $6.5 billion was reached before the bill was 
sent on. Both the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the Science and Technology 
Committee approved the $6.5 billion limit. But the bill did not come to the House floor. 
In the Senate, S 1225, introduced by Simpson (R-Wyoming) and McClure (R-Idaho ), won 
approval with amendments from the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the 
Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development (Table 2). Although S1225 would have 
increased total coverage to only $2.6 billion, it would have done so by allowing different ex post 
assessments for individual reactor operators: "The (Nuclear Regulatory) Commission may establish 
amounts less than the standard premium for individual facilities taking into account such factors as 
the facility's size, location, and other factors pertaining to the hazards" (p. 5). The bill was referred 
to the Senate Environment and Public Works committee where it was considered with S 445 by Hart 
(D-Colorado), S 1761 by Stafford (R-Vermont), and S 2072 by Metzenbaum (D-Ohio). The 
Environment Committee approved a $6.5 billion limit, as in the House, but there was no 
reconciliation among Senators before the end of the last session.5
Investment In Safety Systems 
Although many issues have been debated in Congress (e.g., whether members of the self­
insurance pool could recover payments from the operator of the damaged reactor, see "Subrogation" 
in Tables 1 and 2, or whether coverage should be adjusted for inflation), primary attention has been 
focused on the maximum coverage of the first and second layers of insurance. 6 But an issue of 
perhaps greater significance is the influence of these changes in coverage on the incentives to install 
safety systems. For example, a number of safety systems were prescribed in "Clarification of Three 
5. As of April 1987, HR 1414, co-sponsored by Udall and Philip Sharp (D-Indiana)had been reported out of Subcommittee 
on Energy and the Environment to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. It is similar to the amended version 
of HR 3653 at the end of the 99th Congress. In the Senate, the Energy Committee has considered S 748, a bill that does not 
address liability limits for commercial nuclear power plants, limiting itself to Department of Energy contractors. Given that 
three committees in the House and two in the Senate have jurisdiction, it is likely that a short-term extension will be required 
before resolving the issues that stopped Price-Anderson renewal in 1986. 
6. On other aspects of the attempt to renew the PAA, see "Price-Anderson Legislation Dies in Final Days of 99th 
Congress," Public Utilities Fortnightly (November 13, 1986), p. 38-39. 
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Mile Island Action Plan Requirements: Requirements for Emergency Response Capability" 
(NUREG-0737). These include the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Upgraded Emergency 
Operating Procedures (EOPs), and Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). The SPDS provides 
computer-generated video displays of important safety-related information to plant operators.7 EOPs 
describe appropriate operator response to abnormal conditions without the need to diagnose specific 
events. The ERFs are on- and off-site resource centers where utility and regulatory personnel can 
monitor reactor operation during emergency situations. While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) made installation of these systems mandatory, no deadlines were set for installing them: " 
the Commission has adopted a plan to establish realistic plant-specific schedules that take into 
account the unique aspects of the work at each plant" (NUREG-0737, Supp. l ,  p. 2, July 1982). 
Here, we examine how changes in self-insurance coverage would influence the response 
time to the implementation of NUREG-0737 requirements. We assume that utilities attempt to 
maximize the present value of their investment in reactor safety systems by choosing optimal dates 
of installation. 8 The evaluation of investment alternatives takes account of net cash flows under 
various scenarios: (1) no accident at the firm's plant and no accident in the industry, (2) no accident 
at the firm's plant, but an accident in the industry, and (3) an accident at the firm's plant. The 
present value of the safety system is equal to the sum of the discounted probability of receiving 
normal income over time plus the net return on investment in the safety system. 9 The optimal
installation date depends on the size of the insurance premiums, the interest rate, the cost of the 
safety system, the percentage ofsystem cost recovery, the change in cost as other firms engage in 
research and development, the amount of unrecoverable expenses after an accident, and the 
probability of an accident before and after the installation of the safety system. 
What are the probabilities of these outcomes? Assessments of the probability of reactor 
accidents are hampered by the lack of experience with nuclear power technologies. One alternative 
is a detailed analysis of the probability of failure for reactor sub-systems, known as a probabilistic 
risk analysis (PRA). The most extensive PRA was conducted for the Atomic Energy Commission 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in 
U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (October 1975). The report concluded that the best 
estimate of the probability of a core melt down per reactor year was 0.005%, i.e., with 100 operating 
reactors, there would be a 0.5% chance of melt down in the industry each year. More recent studies 
of particular plants place the probability of a core melt down between 0.1 % and 0.0002% per reactor 
year.10 Also, the NRC has updated its estimate to 0.03%, leading to a New York Times' headline
claiming "By 2005, Nuclear Unit Sees 50-50 Chance of Meltdown," (April 17, 1985; p. A16). 
7. See Joseph P. Joyce and George W. Lapinsky, "A History and Overview of the Safety Parameter Display System
Concept," IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Sciences NS-30, 1 (February 1983). 
8. An article by Peter Huber and Donnamarie McCarthy, 'The Role of the Price-Anderson Act in the Contemporary Tort
System," Public Utilities Fortnightly (May 1, 1986), pp. 22-28, claims "It is impossible for engineers and financial analysts 
to make fine (marginal safety) calculations" (p. 27). We believe, however, that utility executives behave rationally and that 
we can model their behavior, whether or not these decision makers can articulate the reasons for their actions. 
9. For a technical development of the investment model, see Jeffrey Dubin and Geoffrey Rothwell,
"Insurance for Nuclear Plant Accidents and the Adoption of Reactor Safety Systems," (California Institute of 
Technology, December 1986). 
10. See V. Joksimovich, "A Review of Plant Specific PRAs," Risk Analysis 4,4 (1984), pp. 255-66.
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To evaluate changes in the retrospective assessment policy, we assume that the probability 
of an accident without the safety system is equal to 0.03% and that the new safety system reduces the 
probability of an accident at an "average" plant by one-tenth, i.e., to 0.027%. While it is difficult to 
determine the ex ante effectiveness of any safety system, the NUREG-0737 requirements should
reduce operator error in the interpretation of abnormal events through the verification and validation 
of conflicting signals, the rationalization of operating procedures in times of crisis, and the 
integration of personnel. For example, since the mid-1970s, operator error has lead to over 700 
forced shutdowns of nuclear reactors, resulting in more than 23,000 hours of downtime, not 
including operator error at Three Mile Island, Unit 2. ( See the NRC's Licensed Operating Reactors, 
NUREG-0200, volumes 1-10.) Of course, as the effectiveness increases, the value of these systems 
to the firm increases, decreasing the optimal waiting time of system installation. 
The cost of responding to NUREG-0737 is several million dollars, but is expected to fall 
with time as more utilities install the safety systems.11 A utility can recover a portion of its
investment through the allowed rate of return on its rate base, with the portion of recovery differing 
among utilities owing to differences in the policies of state regulatory commissions. These 
differences, as well as the variables discussed above, produce a sequencing of optimal adoption dates 
among utilities: utilities adopting first in states that allow all or most of the cost of the safety system 
to be included immediately in the rate base, holding other variables constant. 
Further, for purposes of illustrating the influence of retrospective assessments based on 
reactor riskiness, we assume that the first utilities to respond to NUREG-0737 would have to spend 
$17 million, $8.5 million of which would decline by 10% per year. Also, while firms are usually 
able to pass their private insurance premiums to their customers as a cost of producing electricity, to 
examine the full influence of changes in insurance premiums on firm behavior, we assume that the 
utility's customers are not charged for retrospective assessments. Finally, we assume that state 
regulators would allow 90% of the safety system investment to be included in the utility's rate 
base.12 
In Table 3 we consider the influence of retrospective insurance premiums on optimal safety 
system installation times.13 We allow (1) the maximum ex post assessment to vary between $5 and
$105 million and (2) a decrease of the assessment based on the implementation of the safety system 
ofO to 30%.14 In our base case of the status quo, the optimal installation date for an "average" plant 
11. The cost of the SPDS alone ranges from less than $1 million, using small dedicated computers, to a $20 million system
meeting military specifications. See papers presented at the Electric Power Research Institute conference on SPDS 
implementation, May 6-8, 1986. 
12. The 10% excluded from the rate base arises from regulatory lag. Some state commissions allow the inclusion of 
Research and Development expenses in the rate base, others do not. Almost all permit the inclusion of Materials and 
Supplies. See National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Part III, Section C, "Rate Base," Annual Report. 
13. We choose the following additional values for our analysis: a real discount rate of 3% and annual purchase-power costs
of $510 million (equal to a price of 7 cents per kilowatthour of electricity with a 70% capacity factor at a 850 megawatt 
power plant). A recovery rate of 80% from the state regulators yields an annual cost to the firm of approximately $100 
million. We believe, based on the experience of General Public Utilities, that $100 million per year is a reasonable expected 
cost to the firm sustaining a reactor accident. Also, while the expected value of the ex post assessment depends on the 
probability distribution over the magnitude of losses, we assume that in the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, 
firms pay the full assessment. 
14. Reductions to a single firm would require increases to other firms . Of course, in the implementation of a differential 
retrospective assessments program, premiums would be based on overall safety performance, not simply the installation of a 
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is 3.81 years after the safety system was mandated (see the upper, left-hand comer of Table 3). As 
the ex post assessment increases, firms install more quickly. While differential retrospective 
assessments induce little change with expected premiums of only $5 million (i.e., a decrease of 
approximately two months), at assessments of $65 million, a 30% reduction induces firms to install 
twice as quickly (i.e., a decrease from 3.58 to 1.65 years). 
Aggregate benefits of such reductions depend on the distribution of losses to society after a 
nuclear accident. However, given that optimal installation dates occur when private costs to the 
firm, including expected retrospective assessments, equal private benefits, reduction in the 
installation times improve social welfare with little increase in social cost. Policy makers must 
determine whether the benefits of greater safety outweigh the administrative costs of instituting 
differential retrospective assessments.15
While insurance premiums are our primary concern, federal regulation is not alone in 
influencing electric utility behavior. State regulatory commissions determine the portion of 
accident-related costs that can be charged to customers and the level of recovery on safety-system 
investment. As firms are more able to charge customers for the accident, the incentive to avoid 
reactor accidents decreases. As the regulatory commission allows the firm to recover a greater 
percentage of the investment in safety systems, the influence of declines in technology costs 
diminishes, so the firm installs more quickly. Hence, Congress should not ignore state utility 
commission policies regarding investment and expense accounting. 
For example, after the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), General Public Utilities (GPU) 
and its operating companies (Metropolitan Edison Co., Pennsylvania Electric Co., and Jersey Central 
Power and Light) faced regulators in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. To replace power from TMI, 
GPU arranged a revolving credit agreement (RCA) of $412 million in June 1979.16 It was not until
May 1980 that the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission and the New Jersey Board of Public 
Utilities allowed rate increases to cover replacement power. However, no allowance was made for 
interest on debt borrowed through the RCA. Further, because TMI was no longer "used and useful," 
it was removed from GPU's rate base. Thus, no funds could be raised through revenues to cover. 
interest on debt or dividends to equity. Only after the restart of TMI-Unit 1 in October 1985 did 
regulators allow earnings on GPU's investment in TMI-1. State regulators did not require GPU 
customers to contribute to the cleanup of TMI-2, estimated at $1 billion, until after the restart of 
TMI-1. While insurance programs instituted since March 1979 should ease cash-flow problems after 
a reactor accident, state regulators will be decisive in determining the financial viability of a utility 
series of safety systems. Thus, reductions in ex post assessments to owners of safer plants (measured, for example, by the 
Engineering Rating Factor) would require increases in assessments from the owners of riskier reactors. The model 
presented here should generalize to other forms of safety behavior at nuclear reactors. 
15. The utility's optimal installation date may differ from the socially optimal date because of the difference between the ex 
post insurance assessment and off-site damages from an accident. It is beyond our scope to define a socially optimal 
insurance and regulatory program. For discussions of the social optimality of Price-Anderson, see Linda Cohen, "Chapter 2: 
Optimal Compensation Systems: The Case of the Price-Anderson Act," in "Essays on the Economics of Licensing Nuclear 
Power Plants," Ph.D. dissertation, California Institute of Technology (September 1978) and John M. Marshall and Louis I. 
Lieb, "Liability and Safety in Nuclear Power Plants," UCLA-ENG-7724(February 1977). 
16. See "Statement of the Honorable Allen E. Ertel," in Financial Fallout From Three Mile Island, Hearings before the
House Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, May 1, 1981. 
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sustaining an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 
Of course, our results depend on our model and on the numerical assumptions underlying 
our calculations. For example, as cost declines more rapidly over time, finns have a greater 
incentive to wait for cheaper systems. And as the discount rate increases, the present value of 
waiting for a cheaper system decreases, leading to longer waiting times. Similarly, as research and 
development costs increase, the finn has a greater incentive to wait until costs fall. (This supports 
the existence of early cooperative research and development among utilities through organizations 
such as the Electric Power Research Institute.) Increases in the size of the reactor encourage quicker 
installation, because of the increase in the opportunity cost of losing the reactor's power. Finally, as 
the probability of an accident increases, finns install sooner.17 
Conclusions 
The current debate over Price-Anderson should consider the Act's influence on the timely 
adoption of safety equipment. If higher levels of coverage are required, Congress could assign a 
larger maximum ex post assessment to the owners of riskier reactors. This proposal is consistent 
with the original version of Simpson and McClure's Senate Bill 1225, which allowed for differential 
assessments. For example, after an accident, finns might be required to pay the same proportion of 
industry self-insurance coverage as they now pay for market-based private1insurance. This 
procedure places the incentive of accident avoidance on the owner of a risky plant, as the insurance 
market does. It was unfortunate that the liability limits of S 1225 prompted its rejection without the 
retention of the differential assessments provision. While providing the same level of coverage, 
differential retrospective assessments induce finns to install safety systems sooner than the 
amendments to the Price-Anderson Act considered at the end of the previous Congress. 
17. Dubin and Rothwell (1986) empirically examine the installation of the SPDS. We find that firms owning plants with
greater numbers of equipment failures and operational errors, resulting in plant shutdowns of more than 72 hours, installed 
the SPDS sooner than other firms. We interpret this finding as support for our contention that as the probability of an 
accident increases, firms install safety systems sooner. 
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TABLE 1: U.S. HOUSE BILLS OF THE 99TH CONGRESS COMPARED 
BILL NUMBER: STATUS H51 H445 H2665 H3653 
QUO 
PRIMARY SPONSOR: PRICE SEIBER- WEISS UDALL 
LING 
WOULD EXTEND PAA TO 1987 1997 NA 2007 1997 
MAXIMUM COVERAGE ($MILLIONS) 660 1160 TOTAL TOTAL 10200 
INDEMNITY? . YES YES YES NO YES 
INFLATION ADJUSTMENT? NO NO NO YES YES 
FIRST LA YER: 
MINIMUM COVERAGE AMOUNT 160 160 160 160 200 
SECOND LA YER: 
TOT AL MAXIMUM AMOUNT 5 10 5 TOTAL 100 
ANNUAL MAXIMUM AMOUNT 5 10 5 TOTAL 10 
DIFFERENTIAL PAYMENTS? NO NO NO YES NO 
SUBROGATION: WHO CAN SUE WHOM? 
VICTIM VS VENDOR NO NO NO NO NO 
UTILITY VS UTILITY NO NO NO YES YES 
FEDERAL VS UTILITY NO NO NO YES YES 
TYPES OF INCIDENTS: 
EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS YES YES NO NO NO 
NON-EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS TORT TORT STRICT STRICT STRICT 
PERSONAL INJURY LIMITATIONS: 
YEARS AFTER DISCOVERY 3 3 3 3 3 
YEARS UNTIL DISCOVERY 20 20 NONE 20 30 
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TABLE 2: U.S. SENATE BILLS OF THE 99TH CONGRESS COMPARED 
BILL NUMBER: STATUS S445 S1225 Sl761 S2072 
QUO 
PRIMARY SPONSOR: HART SIMP- STAF- METZEN-
SON FORD BAUM 
WOULD EXTEND PAA TO 1987 NA 2012 2002 NA 
MAXIMUM COVERAGE ($MILLIONS) 660 TOTAL 2160 TOTAL TOTAL 
INDEMNITY? YES YES YES YES YES 
INFLATION ADJUSTMENT? NO NO NO NO NO 
FIRST LA YER: 
MINIMUM COVERAGE AMOUNT 160 160 160 160 160 
SECOND LA YER: 
TOTAL MAXIMUM AMOUNT 5 TOTAL 15 15 5 
ANNUAL MAXIMUM AMOUNT 5 TOTAL 15 15 5 
DIFFERENTIAL PAYMENTS? NO NO YES YES NO 
SUBROGATION: WHO CAN SUE WHOM? 
VICTIM VS VENDOR NO NO NO NO NO 
UTILITY VS UTILITY NO NO NO NO NO 
FEDERAL VS UTILITY NO NO NO NO NO 
TYPES OF INCIDENTS: 
EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS YES NO YES YES NO 
NON-EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS TORT STRICT TORT TORT STRICT 
PERSONAL INJURY LIMITATIONS: 
YEARS AFTER DISCOVERY 3 3 3 3 5 
YEARS UNTIL DISCOVERY 20 NONE NONE 30 NONE 
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TABLE 3: CHANGE IN INSTALLATION TIMES AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS* 
SAFETY DISCOUNT 
SELF-INSURANCE PREMIUMS -0% -10% -20% -30% 
5 3.81 3.75 3.69 3.64 
25 3.73 3.45 3.18 2.92 
45 3.65 3.16 2.70 2.26 
65 3.58 2.88 2.24 1.65 
85 3.50 2.61 1.81 1.08 
105 3.43 2.35 1.40 0.54 
*Premiums are in millions of dollars. Optimal waiting times are expressed in years.
